France has one of the largest offshore wind resources in Europe, but very little to show for it. To date, the country has only 1.5 gigawatts (GW) of operational offshore capacity, while 8.65 GW have been awarded or are about to be awarded. Implementation, however, has been exceptionally slow: it took ten years to install the first 500 megawatts (MW) and two more years to reach the next gigawatt, according to a report by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA).

This delay is not due to technological or construction problems, as the first projects used more advanced fixed foundation technology than floating foundation technology. In reality, the delay is due to a combination of factors: lengthy administrative procedures, constant legal challenges, and strong local opposition, especially from the fishing, tourism, and coastal communities sectors.

The country has the second largest offshore wind energy potential in Europe. However, it currently ranks sixth in terms of operational capacity, behind countries with much less potential, such as Germany and the Netherlands.

Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Belgium, have made significant progress in developing this technology. In this regard, Romero Moreira, an offshore wind energy engineer at Empire Engineering, told Strategic Energy Europe that “France today is in the same situation as the United Kingdom 5 or 10 years ago, but with different technologies and a more regulatory approach.”

The IEEFA report analyzes: “North Sea countries’ understanding of the importance of wind energy in the energy transition and the simplification of administrative processes partly explain why France’s neighbors have taken such a lead.”

“Offshore wind energy will be the crucial technology to fill the gap left by the impending closure of many of France’s nuclear power plants,” it adds.

The country covers a very low proportion (11%) of its electricity demand with wind power; offshore wind power accounts for only 1%. This places France far behind its northwestern European neighbors.

A planning that has not yet managed to reverse the trend

In the last two years, France has attempted to get back on track with the commissioning of its first three wind farms and the launch of new tenders. Since 2011, numerous auctions have been held to develop offshore wind energy, but to date, only 1.5 GW of the 8.65 GW of awarded capacity has come online.

It took the winning bidders 10 years to install the first 500 megawatts (MW) and two more years for the next gigawatt.

Priority development areas have also been defined, along with a roadmap that envisions 18 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2035.
Three additional wind farms, totaling 1.5 GW, are in the early stages of construction and are not expected to be operational before 2026.

However, the French Energy and Climate Agency itself warns that most of the projects awarded between 2019 and 2022 will not be operational until 2028-2032. Even in the best-case scenario, France would have only 3 GW installed by 2027, equivalent to two EPR nuclear reactors, compared to the 58 currently operating.

High Costs and Structural Barriers

Development costs have also been a considerable barrier. The first three French offshore wind farms—Saint-Nazaire, Fécamp, and Saint-Brieuc—are among the most expensive in Europe, with investments in the high range of €3 to €5 million per MW. This is largely due to logistics costs, a lack of economies of scale, and the absence of a mature supply chain like those found in the United Kingdom or Denmark.

Furthermore, France’s industrial infrastructure does not yet support the widespread deployment of this technology. Unlike its North Sea neighbors, the country has been slower to develop specialized ports, installation fleets, or component factories. This creates bottlenecks that increase costs and slow down project execution.

Bureaucratic Red Tape and Institutional Slowness

The French regulatory framework for offshore wind is one of the most bureaucratic in Europe. For example, the first call for tenders was launched in 2011, but no turbine was operational until 2022. This contrasts with the British or Dutch model, where a single agency acts as a one-stop shop and legal deadlines are short, allowing rapid progress from award to construction.

Permitting delays and legal disputes are undermining France’s competitiveness, warns the IEEFA report, and creates an unattractive environment for private investment. This outlook contrasts with countries like the United Kingdom, which already has over 14 GW in operation and is moving toward more competitive and predictable auction models.

Furthermore, they point out that the high costs associated with overcoming regulatory and legal hurdles have made French offshore wind projects less financially attractive than those in other European countries.

Regarding geographical and environmental considerations, the French coastline presents unique challenges that have hindered the development of offshore wind energy. The Mediterranean Sea, for example, has deeper waters and slower winds than the North Sea, where many of the UK and German offshore wind farms are located.

“These conditions require more advanced and expensive technology, such as floating wind turbines, which are still in the early stages of commercialization. These technological shortcomings particularly affect tenders 5 and 6, in southern Brittany and the Mediterranean, respectively,” the institute explains.

Offshore Wind Energy vs. Nuclear Energy

Offshore wind energy could become a pillar for replacing part of France’s aging nuclear fleet, but it currently competes at a disadvantage. Although the current 58 reactors continue to generate between 75% and 80% of the country’s electricity, many of them will reach their 40-year lifespan by 2030, opening up the potential for new renewable technologies.

However, the expansion of offshore wind is hampered by the strong presence of nuclear power in the country’s energy mix.

Among the main factors hindering this transition are energy market saturation and limitations of the electricity grid, which is already supplied with a low-carbon source; political priorities, which have favored extending reactor life and the development of the European Pressurized Reactor 2 program; and a grid infrastructure designed for centralized plants, which makes it difficult to integrate intermittent generation such as offshore wind.

Furthermore, the low costs of existing nuclear energy reduce the economic urgency of renewable development. However, these arguments ignore the void that will be created when the current reactors are decommissioned, especially considering that the government’s most ambitious scenario envisions only 14 new reactors by 2050. Given this scenario, offshore wind energy is emerging as a strategic alternative that still awaits the necessary support to consolidate its position.

Recommendations to accelerate deployment

The IEEFA report proposes a series of urgent measures to prevent France from being left behind in the European energy transition:

• Simplify licensing procedures, creating a single entity to act as administrative coordinator.
• Reduce the timeframes for filing legal challenges against tenders.
• Adapt the electricity system and modernize the grid, including international connections to export surpluses.
• Eliminate the preferential treatment enjoyed by nuclear energy in the electricity market, leveling the playing field for renewables. “This heavy dependence on nuclear energy has reduced the urgency to invest in renewable energy sources, including offshore wind,” the report warns.
• Provide incentives for private investment by reforming the capacity payment mechanism and including variable renewables.

It is also recommended to promote the use of offshore wind in combination with other technologies such as storage and green hydrogen production, following models applied in the Netherlands and Germany.

“If deployment is not accelerated, France could have only 3 GW of operational offshore wind capacity by 2032, well below the government’s target of 18 GW by 2035,6 meaning that this technology would play a limited role in replacing nuclear reactors that will need to be decommissioned,” the report concludes.